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The response brief from the Department of Fish & Game mostly confuses, rather 
than clarifies, the issues in this case. These areas of confusion, though, can be dealt 
with simply. 
1. Fish & Game did not have a Contract with Leading Edge 
That Fish & Game is identified in the contract between Leading Edge and the 
federal Aviation Management Directorate is not in question. This, however, does not 
make Fish & Game a party to that contract, nor does it make Leading Edge a 
contractor under Fish & Game. The district court did not recognize this distinction 
in its ruling, treating Fish & Game as a party to the contract. R.Vol I at 60. This was 
error. 
Other than being an identified potential user of services, which is not in dispute, 
Fish & Game offers no evidence or argument that, as a matter of law, it can be or 
should have been considered a party to the federal contract between AMD and 
Leading Edge. This contract was created under a federal program, and is 
administered by a federal contracting officer. In addition, there is nothing unique 
about a federal schedule contract that allows other entities, even states, to use the 
contract vehicle. This does not make those users parties to a federal contract with a 
particular vendor. 
2. A Chain of Privity, not Necessarily Direct Privity, is Required by the Statutes 
The statute is quite clear that direct privity is not required either for liability or 
immunity to pass up the chain from employee through subcontractor through 
contractor to owner. This is inescapably inherent in the inclusion of subcontractors 
in Idaho Code section 72-216 and 72-223. Gifford v. Nottingham, 68 Idaho 330 (1948), 
and Adam v. Titan Equip. Supp!J Corp., 93 Idaho 644 (1970), both stand for this 
unexceptional proposition: Earl Frank Gifford was an employee of a subcontractor 
working under general contractor Nottingham; Floyd Duane Adam was employed by 
Roy :Mays, a subcontractor to Titan. 
Whether, when there is an effective chain of privity, liability passes up, and 
immunity passes also, is not at issue in this case. Rather, the central substantive issue 
regarding application of statutory employer immunity here is whether the 
identification of Fish & Game as a "client" in a contract between a federal agency and 
a private business makes the private business a "subcontractor" "under" the "client." 
That is, whether the claimed chain of privity is effective to pass liability and immunity. 
The cases relied upon by Fish & Game do not reach this issue. Certainly no cited case 
holds that either liability or immunity pass through the federal government. There are 
clear federalism and Supremacy Clause issues with taking this approach. These issues 
do not need to be reached here, though, because a "client" or "user" is not a party to 
a contract. Rather than a chain of privity going from owner to contractor to 
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subcontractor, as we see in all the cases cited by Fish & Game, what we have here is 
two contractors, each with distinct contracts, under a federal entity. Neither of these 
two federal contractors is a subcontractor "under" the other, and such a relationship 
would be the sine qua non for application of statutory employer immunity. 
This Court's decision in Struhs v. Protedion Technologies, Inc., 133 Idaho 715 (1999), 
does not hold to the contrary: in fact, it underlines Krinitt's point about the chain of 
privity. This case involved whether a federal entity (the US Department of Energy 
("DOE")), which was paying the workers comp premiums under a cost 
reimbursement contract, can be considered a statutory employer for immunity 
purposes. DOE was not an intermediate in the chain of privity and, indeed, it was 
not even a party to the suit. DOE was the owner, which had engaged a contractor (to 
operate the facility), which had engaged a subcontractor (to provide security), which 
employed Marvin Struhs. His injury was caused by the negligence of a different 
federal agency (the Army), operating on at the DOE facility: the Court held that this 
second agency was not the statutory employer of :J\1r. Struhs. The Court's holding 
was not dependent on the relationship between DOE and the Army, whether the 
Army is permitted to operate on DOE's facility, whether DOE contracts specified 
that the Army would be on-site. The holding depended entirely on the lack of any 
chain of privity between :J\1r. Struhs and the Army. 
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In Liberty Northwest Ins. Corp. v. United States, the federal district court applied Struhs 
in looking at whether statutory employer immunity applied to certain federal entities. 
It found that although the employee's direct employer, a contractor, was doing work 
on an Air Force base, the Air Force and the Department of Defense were not covered 
by statutory immunity, because the contract was between the employer and the Army 
Corps of Engineers (which is also within the Department of Defense). Under his 
holding, only the Aviation Management Directorate is the contracting entity, and even 
other Department of Interior entities which might also be "clients" would not be 
considered statutory employees. 
Neither Struhs nor Liberty Northwest stand for the proposition that a government 
agency outside the chain of privity may be considered a statutory employer. 
3. Applying Immunity without a Chain of Privity Presents a Due Process 
Violation 
This Court has rejected due process challenges to statutory employer immunity 
finding that the legislative trade-off between relief without having to litigate fault on 
the one hand, and immunity from tort liability for entities in the chain of privity is a 
constitutional choice within the discretion of the legislature. See, e.g., Venters v. Sorrento 
Del., Inc., 141 Idaho 245 (2005). I<rinitt argued below, and has argued again here, 
nearly in haec verba, that in the absence of a chain of privity, the trade-off amounts to a 
due process violation. 
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The district court avoided the issue by ruling (erroneously) that there was direct 
privity between Leading Edge and Fish & Game. Here, Fish & Game makes 
essentially the same argument, but also suggests that the issue is not before the Court. 
The exact nature of this argument is somewhat obscure: obviously, Fish & Game 
knows of Krinitt's contention, otherwise, it would not know to dispute it. Be that as 
it may, Fish & Game offers no argument to the effect that the Court, or the 
legislature, can impose statutory employer immunity on an entity outside a chain of 
privity without running afoul of the due process clauses of the United States and 
Idaho constitutions. 
4. Statutory Employer Immunity is a W aivable Affirmative Defense 
The central thrust of Fish & Game's companion appeal, which it repeats here, is 
that statutory employer immunity is not actually a waivable affirmative defense, but 
goes to subject matter jurisdiction. It is simply not possible to reconcile this 
contention with the Court's holding in f-'uhriman v. State, 143 Idaho 800 (2007). 
Statutory employer immunity is, as the Court held, a waivable affirmative defense. 
Subject matter jurisdiction is not. 
As to the issue raised in I<:rinitt's appeal - whether the defense was waived - Fish 
& Game has nothing to add. The facts are clear here: Fish & Game litigated fault, 
including before this Court, and skipped the court-ordered deadlines for raising 
affirmative defenses or filing for summary judgment. Here, it invokes l~thriman, but 
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the facts of that case are distinguishable. Certainly, the defendant in ruhriman had not 
already litigated and lost its principle contentions regarding fault before this Court 
before asserting the affirmative defense. 
The over-literal reading Fish & Game applies to the timing provisions in }uhriman 
rob it of any meaning: if the only issue is whether a plaintiff gets an opportunity to 
argue an issue, there would be no reason not to allow a defendant to raise an 
affirmative defense in a motion for a directed verdict during trial, in post-trial 
motions, or for the first time on appeal. At each juncture, a plaintiff would have an 
opportunity to argue whether the defendant was a statutory employer. This is, indeed, 
exactly the law with respect to subject matter jurisdiction. Affirmative defenses are 
different from subject matter jurisdiction, in that they actually are waivable. Rather, 
the farrier reading of ruhrzman is that at a certain point, it becomes unfair to subject a 
plaintiff to an absolute defense that was not raised when it was supposed to have 
been. 
In this case, it was clearly unfair to allow Fish & Game to raise the defense so late. 
Because Fish & Game was contesting fault, Krinitt engaged experts - as he was 
required to do, because he would not have been able to proceed without them - and 
spent many months taking depositions related to fault. Fish & Game argued fault 
before the district court on summary judgment, and again before this Court. K.rinitt 
had his counsel travel to California to participate in a mediation based on the 
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articulated positions of the parties following the Court's remand. It is true that voir 
dire has not yet commenced in this case, but the logic of Puhn·man should not be 
understood as making this the sole and dispositive consideration upon which a waiver 
rests. 
5. The Alternative Sanction should have been Backdated to February 2013 
In his opening brief, as indicated in his Notice of Appeal, K.rinitt argued that the 
Rule 16 sanction imposed on Fish & Game as an alternative to finding that the 
statutory employer defense was waived should have run from the district court 
ordered deadline for amending the pleadings, rather than from the deadline for 
moving for summary judgment. 
To this point, Fish & Game offers no response whatsoever. It does not and 
cannot show that its failure to comply with the scheduling order with respect to 
amending pleadings to assert an additional affirmative defense was "substantially 
justified," Rule 16(e)(2), or that granting Krinitt the expenses incurred by this failure is 
"unjust." Id. 
The district court made its timing decision based on its flawed reading of rzthriman. 
As noted, the most favorable reading for Fish & Game is that what the timing 
provisions of Puhnman stand for is when an affirmative defense is waived, and cannot 
be raised. Jiuhrzman says nothing at all about whether failure to comply with the 
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explicit deadline for amending pleadings (to assert affirmative defenses) is somehow 
not subject to Rule 16 sanction. 
Here, the consequences to K.rinitt of Fish & Game's unjustified failure to timely 
raise the affirmative defense were substantial. The district court should have 
calculated the sanction from the date of the violation - the deadline for amending 
pleadings - rather than from the deadline for moving for summary judgment. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, and those given in Krinitt's other briefs in this 
consolidated appeal, the district court's grant of summary judgment should be 
reversed, and the case be remanded to the district court 'vvith an instruction to set the 
matter for trial. If the Court does not deem reversal of the summary judgment the 
appropriate remedy, in the alternative it should remand the case to the district court 
with instructions to award K.:rinitt, in addition to the sanction it has already imposed, 
the costs and fees Krinitt incurred between February 15, 2013 and January 31, 2014. 
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